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Does the Shanghai Cooperation Represent an 
Example of a Military Alliance?
By T.Tugsbilguun (Mongolia)
Abstract
T he Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a multilateral security organization established in 2001 with the participation of China, Russia and four Central Asian states including 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is often perceived 
by some analysts in the West as an anti-US or anti-Western alliance. This 
article attempts to answer to the question: Does the SCO represent an 
example of a military alliance? 
The article will answer to the above question by examining the empirical 
factors of the SCO with reference to alliance theory in International 
Relations. Although it concludes that the SCO cannot be considered as 
a military “alliance” from the theoretical and empirical standpoints, it 
nevertheless contains the potential to evolve into a more mature security 
organization which does not necessarily have to be in conformity with 
traditional alliance theory.
Introduction
Founded in 2001 with China, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as members, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an emerging multilateral organization in 
Central Asia and has been characterized as a security organization, a regional 
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forum, and an anti-terrorism coalition. Another widespread perception of 
the SCO is as a Russian and Chinese-led alliance created to counterbalance 
the US supremacy both at the regional and global levels. Indeed, a number 
of analysts, especially in the US have compared the SCO with the Warsaw 
Pact, and speculated over whether this organization might develop into a 
counterweight to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
whether the world is witnessing the start of a new Eastern bloc. 1 In particular, 
an expert on East Asia, Frederick W. Stakelbeck, Jr. explicitly states that 
“the SCO is a menacing confederacy of powerful nations arising out of the 
shadows of the Cold War that could cause tremendous global instability 
and even lead to war”.2  Notwithstanding the fact that India and Iran are 
only observers, with huge differences in terms of foreign policy, he goes 
on to highlight that this organization has the potential of turning into the 
most powerful alliance on earth, given the combination of Russia’s energy, 
military and technology expertise; China and India’s economic and human 
capital, and Iran’s enormous energy resources as well as growing military 
capabilities.3   According to Stakelbeck, “this unique combination makes the 
SCO a formidable adversary for the US”.4  In a similar vein, Peter Brookes, 
a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, asserts that “Russia may be 
1 See for example Frederick W. Stakelbeck, Jr., “Is the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization a Mil i tar y Confederac y?”,  Globalpol it ic ian.com,<http://www.
globalpolitician.com/21244-russia-china> (accessed on October 17, 2008); Peter Brookes, 
“Club For Dictators: An ugly agenda for Asia”, The Heritage Foundation, June 12, 2006, 
Heritage.org,  <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed061206b.cfm> (accessed on 
April 09, 2007); Jehangir S. Pocha, “Summit forges military ties in Central Asia. Six nations 
also consider forming an ‘energy club’”, The Boston Globe, June 18, 2006; Ariel Cohen 
and John J. Tkacik, Jr., “Sino-Russian Military Maneuvers: A Threat to U.S. Interests in 
Eurasia”, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder 1883,  September 30, 2005, Heritage.
org,  <http://www.heritage.org/research/russiaandeurasia/bg1883.cfm> 
(accessed on August 21, 2008); Jonathan Watts, “China Hosts Summit to Rival US”, 
The Guardian, 15 June 2006; Benjamin Goldsmith, “Here There Be Dragons: The Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization”, The Center for Defense Information, September 2005, Ciaonet.
org,  <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/cdi014/> (accessed on March 20, 2007)




looking to create ‘a new and improved’ Asian Warsaw Pact, wielding large 
armies, big economies, nukes and lots of oil/gas”. 5      
Moreover, some SCO actions such as its 2005 Astana Declaration, in 
which the grouping demanded the US to provide a timetable for withdrawal 
of its bases from Central Asia,6 as well as its joint military exercises, 
particularly those conducted in 2005 and 2007 involving military forces 
primarily from Russia and China, raised concerns that the SCO intends 
to establish a military bloc to compete with NATO and diminish the US 
presence in Central Asia. US analysts Ariel Cohen and John J. Tkacik, Jr. 
view these developments as evidences of the fact that “the anti-American 
axis has already begun to work”.7        
In contrast, the political leaders and most analysts in the SCO 
member states, especially those in its two most influential members, Russia 
and China, have repeatedly emphasized that the SCO is not a military 
alliance, since it is not directed against a third party and is only interested 
in combating threats posed by terrorism, separatism and extremism.8  As 
Russian scholar Alexander Lukin asserts “attempts to turn this organization 
into an anti-Western or anti-US bloc are doomed to fail because this would 
contradict the fundamental interests of its members who are interested in 
cooperating with the West in many areas”. 9 Moreover, in their view, the 
SCO represents a new kind of phenomenon in international relations that 
transcends obsolete “bloc-style thinking” of the Cold War period. For 
5 Brookes, “Club For Dictators: An ugly agenda for Asia” 
6 For details see: Declaration of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, Astana, 5 July 2005, Sectsco.org,  <http://www.sectsco.org/html/00500.
html> (accessed on March 21, 2007)          
7 Cohen and Tkacik, Jr., “Sino-Russian Military Maneuvers: A Threat to U.S. Interests 
in Eurasia”, p.3
8 See for example the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and 
Extremism, Shanghai, June 15, 2001, Sectsco.org,  <http://www.sectsco.org/html/0093> 
(accessed on March 25, 2007); Vladimir Putin, “SCO: a new model of successful international 
cooperation”, Moscow, June 14, 2006, Kremlin.ru,  <http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/sdocs/
speeches.shtml> (accessed on April 04, 2007); Yang Jiechi, “Eternal driving force of Shanghai 
Spirit”, Renmin Ribao, June 16, 2008 [a Mongolian translation of this article was obtained 
by author from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia]  
9 Alexander Lukin, “Rossiya i ShOS” [Russia and SCO], Analyticheskiye Zapiski, 
no.6 (26) (Jul.2007), p.4
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instance, Director of the SCO Studies Center in Shanghai, Pan Guang, 
emphasizes that “the SCO has helped to shape a new model of state-to 
state relationships10  characterized by partnership but not alliance, as 
originally spearheaded by China and Russia”.11  He further contends that 
“the relationship between China, Russia and the Central Asian states – 
under the SCO umbrella – constitutes a close partnership with constructive 
intentions while stopping short of military alliance”.12 
However, it should also be noted that not all international relations 
and military experts in Russia and China hold such benign views with 
respect to the SCO’s standing vis-à-vis the West. In particular, retired 
Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, former head of the International 
Military Cooperation Directorate at the Russian Ministry of Defense who 
currently serves as the President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems 
in Moscow, bluntly states that:
Under conditions of NATO expansion, there is a real threat to 
national security of Russia. Hence, I am convinced that only SCO 
could become a real counterweight to expansion on the part of 
the North Atlantic Alliance. In the future, what the SCO needs 
to do is to admit Iran, India and Pakistan as its members.13 
In reference to the purpose of the Sino-Russian military exercise 
“Peace Mission 2005” conducted within the framework of the SCO, 
Professor of International Relations at the People’s University of China 
Jin Canrong is similarly frank asserting that “the main target is the United 
States. Both sides want to improve their bargaining position in terms of 
security, politics and economics”.14 
As seen from the above-stated views, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization has become an object of significant disagreements among 
10 Italic is in text
11 Pan Guang, “A Chinese Perspective on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SIPRI Policy Paper No.17, (Stockholm: 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, May 2007), p.47  
12 Ibid.
13 “ShOS suzhdeno stat’ voyennym al’yansom” [SCO is destined to become a military 
alliance], Rambler.ru, May 15, 2008, <http://www.rambler.ru/news/politics/0/562184254.
html> (accessed on August 25, 2008)  
14 Jin Canrong quoted in Cohen and Tkacik, Jr., “Sino-Russian Military Maneuvers: 
A Threat to U.S. Interests in Eurasia”, p.2  
foreign policy scholars and practitioners with regard to its goals and 
activities, particularly military component of its cooperation. Therefore, 
this article attempts to answer to the question: does the SCO represent an 
example of a military alliance?
In order to answer the above question this article will proceed as 
follows. The first part of the article will briefly review the alliance theory 
literature with the aim to specify what is meant by “alliance” in IR Theory. 
Apart from explaining the reason for the absence of a single acceptable 
definition of the term “alliance”, it will provide succinct distinction between 
the close, yet distinctive terms of “alliance” and “alignment”. Moreover, 
it will demonstrate that in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 world, the 
concept of “alliance” has significantly changed from its classical Cold War 
era meaning. 
The second part will briefly describe the history of the development 
of the SCO, in order to help better understand the nature and essence of 
this organization. 
The third part will discuss respective interests of the two predominant 
members of SCO, China and Russia, as well as those of its other four Central 
Asian members, and in addition, four observer states, including India, Iran, 
Mongolia and Pakistan. In discussing the interests of China and Russia, 
it will touch upon the Russo-Chinese strategic partnership upon which 
the SCO is based. Moreover, this part will demonstrate that there exists a 
host of empirical factors making it unfeasible to turn this organization into 
a full-fledged military alliance such as the hidden divergence of interests 
between Russia and China, mutual suspicion of each other’s motives and 
intentions, absence of a natural empathy and harmony between Central 
Asian states-members of the SCO and different motivations of its observers 
for affiliating with the SCO. Thus, a discussion of these interests would 
contribute to understanding why the SCO is unlikely to develop into a 
typical military alliance.              
 On the conceptual base discussed in first part as well as empirical 
factors reviewed in the second and third parts, the fourth part will analyze 
the SCO in detail with regard to answering the question of whether it 
can be considered as an alliance. In doing so, it will demonstrate how 
the SCO meets and defies conventional alliance theory. Besides theory, 
equal attention will be given to examination of empirical factors as a 
whole. Having examined the conceptual and empirical factors, it will be 
emphasized that conventional alliance theory has a limited application in 
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explaining the phenomenon of the SCO, while the closest resemblance it 
has, is with the “pattern of alignment”. 
Finally, the article will be concluded by arguing that the SCO 
represents a new model of alignment system characterized by a more 
informal and flexible nature, which in turn, represents the true dynamics of 
the changing security environment of the 21st century. Therefore, despite 
the fact that at present it is still premature to conclude that the SCO is a 
military alliance from traditional theoretical and empirical perspectives, it 
nevertheless contains the potential to evolve into a more mature security 
organization which does not necessarily have to conform to traditional 
alliance theories.      
I. What is an alliance? Alliance vs. Alignment
It could be well-observed that in IR literature the question of what 
defines an “alliance” is still essentially contested with many authors 
putting forward different definitions but coming up short of agreeing on 
a single acceptable definition. As Paul Schroeder rightly points out “the 
term ‘alliance’ has often been used loosely to mean simply ‘friendship’ 
or ‘working partnership’”.15  George Liska expresses a similar view to 
Schroeder when he states that “it has always been difficult to say much 
that is peculiar to alliances on the plane of general analysis”.16  
The reason for such a state of affairs seems to lie in terminology, 
especially in the fact that such closely related, yet distinctive terms as 
“alliance” and “alignment” have been often used in academic literature 
interchangeably. This fact is emphasized in the works of a number of 
well-known authorities in the study of alliances, for example, Roger 
Dingman and Glenn Snyder among others.17  In particular, Dingman 
observes that historians have rarely attempted to define alliance and brings 
15 Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of 
Management”, in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security, (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1976), p.227
16 George Liska quoted in George Modelski, “Review: The Study of Alliances”, The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.7, No.4 (December 1963), p.769 
17  See Roger V. Dingman, “Theories of, and Approaches to, Alliance Politics”, in Paul 
Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy, (London: 
Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1979), p.246 and Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics, (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.6
up as an example William L. Langer’s classic study on alliance diplomacy, 
European Alliances and Alignments from the title of which it is clear that 
no distinction is made between the two terms.18  He further contends that 
“writers of international relations textbooks seem to have followed a similar 
course”.19   In this context, he notes that since such terms as coalitions, 
ententes, or alignments had not been distinguished from alliances, they 
have been frequently misused as synonyms.20  Thus, he proposes his own 
definition of alliance as “a specific form of international relationship” 
which refers to:  
a written, formal agreement among two or more states which 
is designed to serve, for a specified term, the interests of those 
states or of their statesmen and bureaucrats, in regard to national 
security.21      
Snyder agrees with Dingman’s observation that the terms “alliance” 
and “alignments” have been employed in IR literature interchangeably and 
on his part, makes specific distinctions between the two terms. According 
to Snyder, alignment is a broader and more fundamental term, which is 
defined as “expectations of states about whether they will be supported or 
opposed by other states in future interactions”.22  As he further elaborates, 
alignment includes alignment “against” as well as “with”, identifying 
potential opponents as well as friends. In general, such expectations arise 
from the perceived interests, capabilities, and observed behavior of other 
states, including their alliance pledges. In this connection, Snyder underlines 
that “they may only be vague estimates rather than certainties or even 
probabilities”. 23                 
As for the term “alliance”, Snyder’s definition is as follows: “Alliances 
are formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, 
in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership”24. 
He further states that: 
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…alliance, properly speaking, can be the result only of a formal 
agreement of some sort that makes explicit the contingencies 
in which military cooperation will occur. This definition 
differentiates alliances from tacit ‘alignments’ based solely on 
common interests…Alliances are associations with a military 
or security purposes. This sets them apart from associations or 
regimes with economic and other purposes, such as OPEC or 
the European Union.25 
Furthermore, Snyder highlights the four key features of formal 
alliances. He first argues that alliances differ according to size. Second, 
alliances may be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, and third, alliances may 
be equal and unequal.26  In this context, he argues that alliances between 
states of similar strength tend to generate reciprocal and symmetrical 
obligations and expectation, whereas alliances between strong and weak 
states are characterized by asymmetrical expectations, if not obligations 
and most importantly, they tend to be dominated by the stronger member, 
which uses the alliance as a vehicle for asserting influence or control. Finally, 
alliances differ according to offensive or defensive purposes.27  However, 
as Snyder emphasizes, such a distinction is not as clear-cut as it might 
seem, since an ostensibly defensive alliance may hide offensive aims, and 
also because a state may have to undertake a tactical offensive in order to 
defend itself, an ally, or its interests effectively.28   
George Modelski makes his own distinctive contribution to clarifying 
the “alliances” and “alignments” dichotomy by describing alignment as 
“a blanket term referring to all types of political cooperation”, whereas 
“alliance” is specified as “military collaboration concerned with third 
power”.29  Thus, in this respect Modelski’s definition is rather different 
from Snyder’s definition by inclusion of alliances into the tacit expectation 
of collaboration that the latter labels as “alignment”.30            
The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations published in 1998 
provides similar definition to Dingman and Snyder, according to which 




29 Modelski, “Review: The Study of Alliances”, p.774
30 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p.6
“alliance” is “a formal agreement between two or more actors – usually 
states to collaborate together on perceived mutual security issues”.31 
Moreover, the above dictionary stipulates that:
By allying themselves together it is anticipated that security will be 
increased in one, some or all of the following dimensions: by joining an 
alliance a system of deterrence will be established and strengthened, by 
joining an alliance a defence pact will operate in the event of war, by joining 
an alliance some or all of the actors will be precluded from joining other 
alliances.32    
Other important characteristics of alliance, as defined by the authors 
of the dictionary Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, include joint 
military exercises, staff training and weapons procurement.33  Being allies 
also implies the need to support each other diplomatically in the conduct 
of their foreign policies.34  In addition, as Evans and Newnham indicate, 
alliances may be secret or open, bilateral or multilateral. 35
On the other hand, influential academics such as Stephen M. Walt and 
Joseph S. Nye, Jr. offer somewhat different interpretations of “alliances”. 
In their view, alliances do not necessarily have to be “formal”. For instance, 
Walt defines alliance as “a formal or informal commitment for security 
cooperation between two or more states”.36  Likewise, Nye describes 
alliances as “formal and informal arrangements that sovereign states enter 
into with each other in order to ensure their mutual security”.37  However, 
Nye’s view that states might ally for nonmilitary reasons and in particular, 
his assertion that “economic concerns might be another reason for an 
alliance”38  is not shared by majority of alliance theorists. According to 
these scholars, alliances are established purely for military or security 
31 Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Dictionary of International Relations, 





36 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press , 1987), p.12 
37 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts, (New York: Longman, 
Sixth Edition, 2007), p.69
38 Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, p.69 
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reasons. As Modelski argues “the act of voting together in an international 
conference does not establish an alliance between two countries, nor does 
the existence of alliance necessarily lead to common voting, for that depends 
on the issue on hand”. 39
As seen from the above, despite a lack of consensus among IR 
theorists on the exact definition of alliance (formal and informal, alliance 
vs. alignment taxonomy), the one point where a majority would agree 
is that “alliances are directly concerned first and foremost with defence 
matters”. 40 
Therefore, what is clear from the above is the fact that in conventional 
theory, “alliances” primarily imply formal associations of states for security 
or military purposes established against a third party. As Snyder emphasizes 
“alliances are aimed at states outside their own membership. This ‘other’ 
orientation points to a fundamental difference between alliances and most 
other international institutions or regimes”. 41 
Furthermore, it seems that it is important to distinguish modern 
alliances, i.e. those of the Cold War era and today from their earlier 
variants. Military alliances or blocs that came into existence in the second 
half of the 20th century, in particular NATO and the Warsaw Pact were 
significantly different from those of the preceding periods such as Three 
Emperors Alliance of 1881, the Entente, and the Anti-Comintern Pact. The 
main difference between the above alliances lies in the fact that the latter 
were all simply results of political agreements between states and as such 
had no integrated military-political structure with permanent operational 
headquarters or a rapid reaction force, while their armies had no unification 
in armaments, not to mention a common military doctrine.42  The only 
requirement of signatory-countries was to enter a war if any of the parties 
was attacked. In contrast, NATO as well as the now-defunct Warsaw Pact 
(1955-1990) or today’s Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) have all of the aforementioned attributes and are 
foremost designed for collective defense against external aggression. In 
this connection, it would be appropriate to quote Modelski who stated in 
39 Modelski, “Review: The Study of Alliances”, p.774 
40 Ibid., p.775
41 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p.4
42 On characteristics of a modern military alliance see NATO Handbook 2001, 
(Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), pp.42-57
his review of Osgood’s book on NATO that “alliance is common defence 
and defence is use of military power”.43 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that since the concept 
of “security” is undergoing significant transformation in the post-Cold 
War period, it will inevitably affect the structure and purposes of modern 
military alliances. For instance, when NATO was first conceived in 1949, 
its primary goal was to deter an eventual attack by the Soviet Union 
and its allies, whereas today this alliance is guided by a broader concept 
of security. Security encompasses not only military but also political, 
economic, social and environmental factors.44  As Marcel de Haas indicates, 
this comprehensive approach to security includes such aspects as free 
and fair elections; well-organized administrative, law-enforcement and 
judicial organs at national, regional and local levels; employment; housing; 
education and health services.45  Only when all of these dimensions of 
security are provided, then a stable and secure situation can be reached. This 
philosophy has been guiding NATO in its operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan.46  In this connection, de Haas notes that “during its operations 
in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, the Western alliance realized that its 
concept of security should include other aspects than military, in order to 
achieve a stable international security environment”.47    
While in conventional alliance theory, alliances are primarily taken 
as formal associations of states against a third party, due to the changing 
nature of “security” today, definitions are undergoing transformation. 
Modern alliances pay homage to a broader concept of security which in 
turn affects the nature and purposes of alliances. This in turn shows that 
the concept of “alliance” in its classical sense is becoming increasingly 
inapplicable in explaining the current tendencies surrounding the whole 
system of “alliances” and “alignments”.       
43 Modelski, “Review: The Study of Alliances”, p.771
44 Marcel de Haas, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Momentum towards a 
Mature Security Alliance, (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 
2007), p.14 <http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080100-cscp-haas-art-sm.
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II. The Shanghai Five and the creation of the SCO
The SCO evolved from the Shanghai Five, regional mechanism of 
consultation between China, Russia and three Central Asian states, namely 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. At the time of its inception in 1996, 
the Shanghai Five had the aim to resolve the border disputes between the 
Soviet Union’s successor states and China. This very term first emerged 
at the summit meeting of the five states in Shanghai in April 1996 during 
which China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan concluded the 
Agreement on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions. The following 
year heads of the aforementioned five states – Jiang Zemin, Boris Yeltsin, 
Nursultan Nazarbaev, Askar Akaev and Emomali Rahmonov signed in 
Moscow another landmark document entitled the Agreement on Reduction 
of Military Forces in Border Regions.
The third summit meeting of the Shanghai Five held in Almaty, Kazakhstan 
on July 3-4, 1998, marked a fundamental turning point in the development of 
relations among participant-states. Starting from that meeting Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ceased to represent one party in the Shanghai process 
– they came out as independent parties. The primary purpose of the meeting was 
to signify the agreements reached in 1996 and 1997, including resolving Soviet 
era issues and as one observer notes, to make the grouping “weightier and more 
solid”48.  Moreover, the Almaty meeting witnessed the extension of the contents of 
the meetings from discussing the issues related to confidence-building measures in 
border regions to the prospects of “developing comprehensive mutually beneficial 
cooperation in spheres of politics, security, diplomacy as well as trade-economic, 
cultural-humanitarian and other areas”49.  Hence, the Shanghai Five’s scope of 
activities went beyond the initial framework of collaboration resulting in new 
areas and new levels of cooperation.
The fourth and fifth summits of the Shanghai Five were held respectively 
in 1999 and 2000 in Bishkek and Dushanbe. The 2000 Dushanbe Summit was 
significant in that the Russian Federation was represented by the newly-elected 
President Vladimir Putin, and also through the participation of President Islam 
Karimov of Uzbekistan as a guest of the host state. As Chinese scholar
48 Vladimir Akimov quoted in Jefferson E. Turner, “What is Driving India’s and 
Pakistan’s Interest in Joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization?”, Strategic Insights, 
Volume IV, Issue 8 (August 2005)
49 “History of development of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”, Sectsco.org, 
<http://www.sectsco.org/html/00035.html> (accessed on March 20, 2007)
Zhao Huasheng underlines, this meeting became another significant step 
in the Shanghai Five’s evolution from a structure with a limited number of 
participants, to having an “organizational” character50.  As a result of the 
summit, the heads of states agreed to include the issues pertaining to prevention 
of military threats, conducting joint military exercises as well as exchange of 
experience in various fields into the framework of cooperation. Furthermore, it 
was decided at the summit to regularly organize meetings of defense ministers 
as well as of senior officials in charge of state security, justice, border protection 
and customs and to take into consideration the possibilities of holding joint 
field training to combat terrorism and natural disasters. In this respect, the 
joint communique released from the summit called for establishment of a 
counter-terrorism center in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan “to jointly combat national 
separatism, international terrorism and religious extremism”51. As Benjamin 
Goldsmith argues, “at the 2000 summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, the Shanghai 
Five ceased to be an organization bound by a common conflict and was 
transformed into an organization bound by common interests”52. 
Having successfully solved the problems inherited from the Soviet era, 
members of the Shanghai Five went one step further. At the summit meeting held 
in Shanghai in June 2001 the Shanghai Five was transformed into the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization which included the five founding members, plus 
Uzbekistan.  The fact that Uzbekistan, a country which has no common border 
with China, joined the SCO implied that members of this organization found a 
common area of interest that extended beyond the initial aims of the Shanghai 
Five.  All six members of SCO are to greater or lesser degree authoritarian 
regimes, bound by common interest to suppress radical Islamist movements in 
their respective territories53.  Each has domestic problems with militant Islamist 
groups: Chechen separatists in the Northern Caucasus (although somewhat 
diminished in the past four years) have been fighting a bloody war against 
Moscow for over a decade; the East Turkestan Islamic Movement in Chinese
50 Zhao Huasheng, Kitai, Tsentral’naya Aziya i Shankhaiskaya Organizatsiya 
Sotrudnichestva [China, Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization], 
Carnegie Moscow Center Working Paper 5/2005, (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 
2005, p.6 <http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/workpapers/73064.htm> (accessed on August 
08, 2008)
51 Turner, “What is Driving India’s and Pakistan’s Interest in Joining the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization?”  
52 Goldsmith, “Here There Be Dragons: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”
53 Ibid.
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Xingjian-Uighur Autonomous Region is fighting to create an independent state; 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which were aided 
by the Taliban are operating in Central Asian states54.  As these militants have 
been receiving transnational support, Russia and China deemed it important to 
develop regional cooperation on counter-terrorism, while the smaller members 
have sought to eliminate the threat these groups posed to their regimes55.  
The establishment of the SCO at the Shanghai summit meeting was 
followed by a series of policy decisions and conventions. The Declaration on 
the Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization identified the newly-
founded organization’s objectives as follows:
strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborly friendship among the 
member states; encouraging effective cooperation among the member 
states in political, economic and trade, scientific and technological, 
cultural, educational, energy, communications, environment and other 
fields; devoting themselves jointly to preserving and safeguarding 
regional peace, security and stability; and establishing a democratic, 
fair and rational new international and political order56.   
The communique on arms control reaffirmed the SCO’s support for the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and opposition to the U.S. National Missile 
Defense (NMD) program, as well as declaring Central Asia as a nuclear free zone57. 
The SCO member states also reiterated their support for the United Nations 
Charter and pledged non-interference in each other’s internal affairs58.  Similarly, they 
indicated that there was interest in starting a dialogue with the ASEAN Regional 
Forum (ARF)59.  The heads of states also agreed to accelerate institutionalization 
of cooperation mechanisms in areas of border security, confidence-building, anti-
terrorist, separatist and extremist activities, economic cooperation, and social/cultural 
exchanges, as well as a mechanism for dispute resolution among SCO partners.         
The highlight of the summit meeting was the Shanghai Convention on 
fighting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. Alyson J. K. Bayles and Pal Dunay 
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid. 
56 The Declaration on the Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
June 15, 2001, Shanghai, Sectsco.org,  http://www.sectsco.org/html/00088.html (accessed 
on March 25, 2007)  




underline that the SCO’s founding documents signal the special interest of the 
member states in fighting what they defined as “terrorism, separatism and 
extremism”60.  Leaders of the SCO member states take credit that members of 
the grouping had started to work on the draft of the above-said Convention 
two years before the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York61.  In this 
context, Alexander Lukin argues that the single definitions of such terms as 
“terrorism”, “separatism” and “extremism” contained in the Convention, 
is of particular importance since the absence of consensus on terminology 
serves as one of main obstacles to international cooperation against these 
phenomena62.  For instance, in the eyes of some people, Chechen separatists 
and Palestinian participants of intifada are terrorists and extremists, whereas 
for others they are freedom fighters against imperialism and for national 
liberation. In addition, the Convention continued to focus the SCO on 
regional security issues, while downplaying any notion of the SCO as a 
military alliance63.    
After September 11, 2001 the SCO started to evolve more rapidly. The 
US deployed its troops to several Central Asian states and established bases 
from which to operate against Al Qaeda’s main network in Afghanistan. 
While Russia and China recognized the U.S. right to respond against radical 
Islamist groups which were the sources responsible for the terrorist attacks, 
the establishment of U.S. airbases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan raised 
concerns64.  At the 2002 Saint-Petersburg summit meeting, the member states 
of SCO adopted The Charter of Shanghai Cooperation Organization which 
identified goals, principles and basic directions of the organization. 
60 Alyson J.K. Bayles and Pal Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a 
regional security institution”, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SIPRI Policy Paper 
No.17, (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, May 2007), p.4
61 Alexander Lukin and Alexei Mochulsky, “Shankhaiskaya organizatsiya sotrudnichestva: 
strukturnoye oformleniye i perspektivy razvitiya” [Shanghai Cooperation Organization: 
structural formation and perspectives of development], Analyticheskiye Zapiski, no. 2(4) 
(Feb.2005), p. 8
62 Alexander Lukin, “Shankhaiskaya organizatsiya sotrudnichestva: chto dal’she?” 
[Shanghai Cooperation Organization: what lies ahead?], Rossiya v global’noi politike, No.3, 
(May-June 2007), <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/26/7700.html> (accessed on April 
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In addition, the Charter lists several basic principles of international law as 
the foundations of the organization, including the sovereign equality of states and 
the rejection of hegemony and coercion in international affairs65.  Furthermore, 
it contained a statement that the SCO is “not directed against other States and 
international organizations”66.       
The May 2003 summit meeting in Moscow concluded the institutional 
organization of the SCO. The most significant actions taken by the SCO heads of 
state was their decisions to establish the SCO headquarters in Beijing and launch 
activities of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS).67  The Secretariat of 
the SCO started to function in Beijing in 2004, while RATS was launched the 
same year with the base in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Zhang Deguang of China was 
the first Secretary-General of the SCO, and the current Secretary-General Bolat 
Nurgaliev of Kazakhstan has been serving since 2007. The SCO Secretariat has 
a permanent staff of 30 and its initial budget was $ 2.6 million68.  The remainder 
of the SCO’s 2004 budget of $ 3.1 million was allocated to RATS69. 
As the process of SCO’s evolution went further, four states, namely 
Mongolia, Iran, India and Pakistan were admitted to the SCO as observers in 
2004 and 2005, respectively. Although Afghanistan does not have an official 
observer status in the SCO, it works in close collaboration with the organization, 
and its President Hamid Karzai has been regularly attending the SCO summit 
meetings. Thus, as of today the SCO encompasses all countries in or bordering 
the Central Asian region.
III. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization participants 
and their interests 
3.1 China
The very fact that the SCO’s predecessor, the Shanghai Five was created with 
China on one side and the Soviet Union’s successor states on the other made 
65 See The Charter of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, June 07, 2002, Saint-
Petersburg, Sectsco.org, http://www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=96&LanguageID=2 
(accessed on August 20, 2008)
66 Ibid.
67 Turner, “What is Driving India’s and Pakistan’s Interest in Joining the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization?”
68 Bayles and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional security 
institution”, p.5
69 Ibid. 
70 See for example Goldsmith, “Here There Be Dragons: The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization”, Susan L. Shirk, “China’s Multilateral Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific”, 
Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission “China as an Emerging 
Regional and Technology Power:  Implications for U.S. Economic and Security Interests”, 
February 12-13, 2004, Uscc.gov.,
 http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2004hearings/written_testimonies/04_02_12wrts/
shirk.htm (accessed on August 14, 2008) 
71 Susan L. Shirk, China, Fragile Superpower, (Oxford University Press, 2007), 
p.120
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Beijing its natural nucleus as the grouping was gradually taking the shape of 
multilateral organization. As a number of analysts and scholars indicate, at its 
heart the SCO is the Chinese project70  and as such it serves as the matter of great 
pride for the nation. In particular, a leading US expert on China, former Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State, Susan L. Shirk contends that “Pride of ownership 
makes the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) China’s favorite regional 
organization and useful precedent for expanding its role in other organizations”71. 
In the official Chinese view, the two focal points of China’s regional cooperation 
framework are the SCO and ASEAN Plus Three72. 
In this respect, it would be appropriate to note that China’s embrace of 
multilateralism starting from mid-1990’s is a remarkable phenomenon that 
can be witnessed in other fields of the country’s diplomacy, including notably 
its relations with South East Asian countries and its growing contributions to 
UN peacekeeping missions73.  For instance, Chinese scholar Pan Guang asserts 
that it “symbolizes the entry of Chinese diplomacy into a new stage, with an 
orientation towards multilateral cooperation”74.  Through instrumental use 
of multilateral methods, China has been conducting a policy to convince its 
immediate neighbors and surrounding countries that China’s constructive, 
responsible and non-threatening behavior will be beneficial for them.  
In the case of the SCO, this multilateral organization represents an 
important avenue for China in developing fruitful cooperation with its former 
adversary – Russia - helping it avoid future conflicts and frictions as well as 
establishing an orderly framework for their coexistence in Central Asia. 
In particular, if considered from a geopolitical perspective, the interests 
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of two competing powers, China and Russia could potentially clash in Central 
Asia. As such, this might be an important stimulus for collaboration between two 
powers to exclude or at least minimize such risks. The SCO serves as a structure 
that brings together and balances the interests of China and Russia. Moreover, it has 
provided opportunities for both sides to hold regular consultations and meetings 
in various fields at different levels which in turn helps better understand each other 
and enhances their mutual trust.     
As regards Central Asian states, since their independence China has not 
encountered any difficulties in developing bilateral relationships with them. But 
nevertheless, until the creation of the SCO, China did not have a multilateral structure 
which linked China with Central Asia as a whole75.  Although the above fact had 
no adverse effect on development of bilateral relations, it limited to a certain extent 
resolution of common regional problems76.  The SCO has created conditions for 
developing multilateral cooperation and enabled China to hold dialogue with all 
countries in the region as a group.
However, as Bayles and Dunay rightly point out, in all those aforementioned 
cases the choice of diplomatic methods does not imply that there are no hard core 
security issues at stake for China77.  In the SCO’s case, the suppression of the “three 
evils” of terrorism, separatism and extremism represents an important objective for 
China. The main target of the Chinese anti-terrorism campaign is the East Turkestan 
Islamic Movement (ETIM) which advocates the independence of Xinjiang and is 
believed to have close connections with the Al Qaeda terrorist network78.  Thus, 
after the September 11 terrorist attacks on  the USA, China managed to get ETIM 
included into some Western lists of terrorist organizations79.  
The problem of “national separatism” in Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous 
Region has a direct relevance to the Central Asian states. This is linked with 
geographical, ethnic and confessional closeness as well as with the commonality of 
centuries-long historical processes in Xinjiang and Central Asia. Xinjiang borders 
three of Central Asian states as well as such Islamic flashpoints as Kashmir and 
75  Zhao, Kitai, Tsentral’naya Aziya i Shankhaiskaya Organizatsiya Sotrudnichestva, p.29
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77 Bayles and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional security 
institution”, p.13 
78 See Pan, “A Chinese Perspective on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, p.46; and 
Goldsmith, “Here There Be Dragons: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”  
79 Bayles and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional security 
institution”, p.14
Afghanistan. From the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, it shares the longest 
border with Kazakhstan (over 1,700 km). The Central Asian region is also a home 
to a well-established Uighur Diaspora, the largest of which lives in Kazakhstan 
(over 220 thousand people), and which occupies in terms of number, the third 
place in the country and the second in the world after the PRC itself80.  
Due to their large number, by supporting the idea of a “struggle for 
independence”, representatives of Uighur populations of the Central Asian states, 
have expanded the social base of protest and thereby provided fertile ground 
for the rise of ethnic separatism in Xinjiang81.  In addition, external factors have 
undoubtedly played their part in the growth of separatism in China. The collapse of 
the Soviet Union, intensification of ethnic conflicts in the post-Soviet space as well 
as in some Eastern European countries coupled with the revival and consolidation 
of the Islamic world and internationalization of terrorism have all awakened 
dormant socio-economic and political forces that led to re-emergence of Uighur 
separatism. Thus, the early 1990s saw the explosion in numbers of overseas Uighur 
organizations which not only had established ties with each other but also with 
underground separatist groups in Xinjiang82.  
The above-mentioned tendencies serve as the matter of grave concern for 
Chinese leadership which to a large extent played an important role in the Chinese 
active participation in the SCO. Geographic proximity of Xinjiang-Uighur 
Autonomous Region to Central Asia is certainly one of main reasons for China’s 
membership in the SCO. To sum up, one of the most important reasons for 
China’s initiation and involvement with the SCO is its genuine interest in having 
guarantees of unequivocal support from its neighboring countries for the principle 
of territorial integrity of the PRC.                                      
A second major interest which China has in the SCO is what Zhao defines 
as the “guarantee that Central Asia is a stable strategic rear” of China83.  As he 
further elaborates: 
80 K. Khaphizova, “Separatizm v Sin’dzyan-Uigurskom avtonomnom raione Kitaya: 
Dinamika i potentsial vliyaniya  na situatsiyu v Tsentral’noi Azii” [Separatism in Xinjiang-
Uighur Autonomous Region of China: Dynamics and Potentials of its Impact on the 
Situation in Central Asia], Tsentral’naya Aziya i Kavkaz, No.1, (2003),  <http://www.ca-c.
org/journal/rus-01-2003/01/khaprimru.shtml> (accessed on 09 August 2008)   
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Huasheng Zhao, “Central Asia in China’s Diplomacy”, in Eugene Rumer, Dmitri 
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Given this objective of strategic security, China must prevent the 
formation of any real and potential strategic threat, ensure that the region 
not be controlled by any country or state group hostile to China, oppose 
militarization of the region and formation of any political and military group 
directed against China84. 
This objective belongs to the sphere of the national interests of the PRC, but it 
can also be included into the matters of the country’s grand strategy and geopolitics. 
Therefore, its content is somewhat different from the earlier mentioned objective of 
providing state security through combating ETIM. From this angle Central Asia 
is acquiring a new place in the foreign policy of the PRC, representing different 
strategic functions and interests. 
In particular, from the strategic perspective, the southern and eastern directions 
are considered as having the utmost importance in the country’s foreign policy. 
According to Beijing, the most important and difficult task of foreign policy strategy 
of the PRC is to prevent Taiwan from gaining formal independence and therefore, 
as Zhao stresses, “it needs to constantly prepare for a possible showdown with 
Taiwan should the island seriously challenge the mainland”85.  He further explicitly 
states that “the US hidden or open, direct or indirect support of Taiwan as well as 
its confrontational policy aimed at containing China’s rise” might lead to strategic 
conflict between China and the US, and therefore, as Zhao argues, “it is essential to 
provide peace and stability in other strategic directions”86.  Thus, it is in the Chinese 
strategic interest that Central Asia serves as the “stable strategic rear of China”.   
In this connection, it is worth of mentioning that the 2000 Dushanbe Declaration 
of the Shanghai Five87  which precipitated the formation of the SCO in 2001, included 
two references to Taiwan, which one could assume to have little relevance to the 
Central Asian region88.  This clearly shows that the highest priority for China is the 
Taiwan issue and thereby substantiates the earlier-mentioned designation of Central 
Asia in the Chinese foreign policy as the “stable strategic rear of China”.   
84 Ibid. 
85 Zhao, Kitai, Tsentral’naya Aziya i Shankhaiskaya Organizatsiya Sotrudnichestva, p.33
86 Ibid. 
87 Dushanbe Declaration by the Heads of State of the Republic of Kazakhstan, of 
the People’s Republic of China, of the Kyrgyz Republic, of the Russian Federation, and 
of the Republic of Tajikistan, Shanghai Five, June 6, 2000, Mid.ru,  <http://www.ln.mid.
ru/Bl.nsf/0/A69BB7197B47EC174325699C003B5F9D?OpenDocument> (accessed on 
March 20, 2007)
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Third, Central Asia is becoming increasingly important to China 
for achieving its goal to intensify its economic development and exert 
control over the region’s rich oil and natural gas resources. Rapid economic 
growth is high on the Chinese agenda and one of the main problems facing 
China today is the enormous gap in development between its eastern and 
western regions. Therefore, maintaining good relations with the Central 
Asian countries - members of the SCO is seen as an important factor for 
development of China’s western region. The 2000 Dushanbe Declaration 
called on Central Asian states to take active part in developing the western 
region of China.
On the other hand, trade with China is important for all Central Asian 
states. Today China accounts for around 10 percent of Central Asia’s trade 
volume89.  As far as China is concerned, in economic terms, Central Asia 
has not had a great overall impact on the Chinese economy, for its share 
of China’s total trade volume is small.90  In particular, in 2005 when total 
trade reached more than 1,400 billion U.S. dollars, trade with Central Asia 
totaled just slightly more than 8.7 billion U.S. dollars91.  Thus, both in 
absolute or relative terms, trade with Central Asian states represents only 
a small portion of China’s total foreign trade.
As Zhao concludes, “from Beijing’s perspective, Central Asia is of 
economic importance primarily with respect to the development of the 
country’s Northwest, especially Xinjiang, the main beneficiary of trade 
with Central Asia.”92 
Fourth, Central Asia’s rich mineral resources are becoming 
increasingly important for China’s rapid economic development, which is 
of high strategic importance for the nation. Energy represents an important 
component of China’s economic cooperation with Central Asian states, 
and Beijing deems it important to insure access to rich Caspian oil and gas 
reserves. For instance, China has become a major investor in Kazakhstan’s 
oil industry with its companies starting their operations in that country 
since 1997.93  The two countries are jointly building a new 2,900-kilometer 
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oil pipeline which will run from Atyray through Kenkiyak, on to Kumkol, 
Atasu, and then Alashankou on the Kazakh-Chinese border94.  By the end of 
2005 two stretches were already operational.95  In addition, in August 2005 
the state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) bought the 
Canadian company PetroKazakhstan, which has the second largest proved 
oil reserves in Kazakhstan, and in December 2006 China’s CITIC Group 
purchased the Kazakhstan oil assets of the Canadian company Nations 
Energy for USD 1.9 billion, the third largest overseas oil acquisition made 
by a Chinese company.96   
Hence, all of the above-stated evidence demonstrates that the 
cooperation on the part of Central Asian states as well as the over-all 
stability in the region is becoming essential for the attainment of China’s 
long-term strategic interests.
3.2 Russia
Russia represents one of the two predominant members of the SCO 
alongside China. As the sovereign of the most of the Central Asian region 
for over a century, it has extensive historical and cultural ties to the region 
and a strong belief that Central Asia is its natural sphere of influence. 
97 Throughout almost two centuries of Moscow’s rule in Central Asia, 
especially during the 70 year-Soviet period, close bonds were formed 
between Russia and Central Asian nations in the areas of politics, economy, 
defense, culture, language, social life and ideology. The basis of Russia’s 
interests in the Central Asian region today thus lies in its desire to preserve 
these special relations.     
94 Martha Brill Olcott, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Changing the 
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26, 2006), p.3,   
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95 Ibid. 
96 See “CNPC secures PetroKazakhstan bid”, BBC News, 26 October 2005,  <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/3723249.stm> (accessed on October 07, 2008) ; and Xinhua, “China’s 
CITIC Group acquires Kazakhstan oil assets for 1.91 bln US dollars”, People’s Daily 
(English edition), 1 January 2007
97 Moscow ruled most of the Central Asian region first during the period of the Russian 
Empire from the late 19th century until October Revolution of 1917 and then later during 
the existence of USSR from 1922 until December 1991.
Given the long history of Russia’s predominance in Central Asia, 
it is no surprise that it would not be in Russian interests to let China 
gain overwhelming prominence there. Therefore, as Bayles and Dunay 
convincingly argue “in Russia’s relations with the Central Asian states, 
the SCO plays a supplementary and consolidating role”98. Although 
Russia is prepared to cooperate with Central Asian republics within the 
framework of the SCO, it prefers to exercise its traditional influence on 
Central Asian nations through the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) of which China 
is not member. Compared to SCO, Russia holds much greater influence 
on Central Asian nations within these organizations, giving it a stronger 
interest in projecting its power through them.
However, this does not imply that Russia has no interest in the SCO 
whatsoever. As Russian scholar Mikhail Troitskiy asserts “the SCO has 
multiple meanings and purposes for Russia” 99.  First, the creation of the 
SCO in 2001 which coincided with the conclusion of the bilateral Treaty on 
Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation, further strengthened 
the Russo-Chinese strategic partnership, first proclaimed in 1996 during 
the Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s visit to China. In this context, it 
could be even argued that to a larger part the SCO is based on the strategic 
partnership between Russia and China.
As Thomas S. Wilkins rightly points out, “this partnership is primarily 
founded upon a number of mutual interests not shared values”.100  Both 
Russia and China have a strong interest in resisting domination of the 
international system by the U.S and its allies. Bobo Lo argues that “The 
relationship is clearly established on the basis of common interest rather 
than “shared values” or ideological stereotypes… this is a realist (and even 
98 Bayles and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional security 
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cynical) union of interests, not a love-in”101.  Both of them are concerned with 
what they perceive as negative tendencies in the development of the international 
situation. According to the former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov: 
Russian-Chinese cooperation has a specific significance in such key areas 
as the raise of prestige and role of the United Nations, assertion of the primacy 
of international law in world affairs, maintenance of strategic stability and above 
all, preservation of the ABM Treaty as well as creation of the just and equitable 
international economic order. 102
It is evident that the above-stated Russian-Chinese objectives as 
reflected by Igor Ivanov, derive from their mutual concern with what they 
consider as the emerging tendency designed to dismantle the existing system 
of the international law and creation of the centre of international politics 
excluding the UN and without participation of China and Russia.  103  In 
particular, what brings together Moscow and Beijing above all is the danger 
of US strategic assertiveness, manifested in such actions as the NATO 
air strikes against Yugoslavia over Kosovo in 2000, the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, the expansion of NATO, alliance with Japan and National Missile 
Defense (NMD) program. In this sense, it is consistent with realist notions 
of “balancing against threats”.104   
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize the fact that today’s Russo-
Chinese strategic partnership is nothing like Sino-Soviet alliance of a more 
than half a century ago. Rather than a relic of the Cold War, the strengthening 
relationship between China and Russia is driven by a complex set of shared 
interests and different priorities. As noted earlier, Russia and China explicitly 
avoid the trappings of a formal alliance. Not wishing to antagonize the West 
by creating an explicit Russo-Chinese alliance and trigger a new Cold War, 
both parties have been deliberately emphasizing that their alignment including 
their collaboration within the SCO is not aimed at any “third party”.105
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For instance, in an interview on 4 June 2002, to the Chinese People’s Daily 
newspaper Russia’s then-President and the current Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin explicitly stated that “SCO is not military bloc but an organization 
which can play an important role in promoting development in Asia”106. 
In this connection, one needs to bear in the mind the differences between 
“alignments” and “alliances” discussed in the Chapter Two.
 Second, while cooperating with the US in Central Asia during anti-
Taliban campaign of 2000-2001, Russia found the SCO as a useful means 
to balance its relationship with Washington by strengthening ties with 
China and Central Asian states.107   Finally, as the Kazakh analyst Zakir 
Chotaev underlines: 
The SCO is a structure that allows Moscow to control and limit 
Beijing’s activities in Central Asia… This Organization [is valued for] 
the conditions and opportunities it provides for developing multilateral 
relations [with Central Asian states], for enhancing regional security 
with participation of China and for coordinating SCO members ‘foreign 
policies’.108 
At the same time, Chotaev considers that “Russia does not hinge its 
efforts to expand influence in Central Asia on SCO mechanism”.109  The 
last point is particularly important as it clearly shows that China and Russia 
will fall short of forming a military alliance. As mentioned earlier, Russia’s 
main tools of collaboration with the former Soviet republics including 
Central Asian states are CIS and CSTO of which the latter serves as the 
focal point for defense cooperation in the most of former post-Soviet space. 
The CSTO includes Armenia and Belarus along with Russia and the four 
Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
Although several steps have been taken to establish links between the SCO 
and CSTO, as Troitskiy emphasizes, “CSTO-SCO contacts remain limited 
overall, and this seems to be in line with Russia’s interests in and vision of 
the SCO”.110  What is more, while the CSTO is designed as a traditional 
defense arrangement, the SCO explicitly renounces any ambition to develop 
106 Vladimir Putin quoted in Troitskiy, “A Russian Perspective on the Shanghai 
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military cooperation apart from intelligence sharing and limited joint 
exercise, primarily in the sphere of counter-terrorism.111  Moreover, the 
CSTO is a bloc where Russia’s role as a central hub in defense cooperation 
and collective decision making is beyond challenge or question, which 
has the special significance for Russia.112  In the SCO, as Troitskiy further 
elaborates, “Russia has to accept the role of a junior founding partner and 
share influence with China”. 113
In addition, the fact that the Central Asian states are becoming 
increasingly inclined to use the SCO as a buffer to balance Russian and 
Chinese influence in the region is certainly not in the long-term Russian 
interest. As Martha Brill Olcott observes “It is the one meeting place 
where Russia sits down with the leaders of these states and is immediately 
confronted with a strong leader of nearly equal influence and with very 
different economic goals”.114   
There is little evidence to suggest that Russia is eager to share 
the intelligence collected by Moscow, or the Central Asian countries 
with Beijing. In this respect, Olcott emphasizes that today intelligence 
establishments of Central Asian countries are collaborating more closely 
with Moscow that has been the case any time since their independence.115 
Given the fact that historically Russia and China have never been true 
allies except the brief period starting from the establishment of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949 until the outbreak of Soviet-Chinese ideological 
conflict at the beginning of 1960s, suspicion of each other’s motives and 
intentions simply run too deep.
Similarly, in the economic field Russia and China do not completely 
trust each other. For instance, Russia is more inclined to promote its 
interests in Central Asia through the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EURASEC), which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan as well as Belarus.116  Given China’s increasing economic 
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zone with its Central Asian partners through EURASEC rather than 
the SCO.117  In this connection, Lukin notes that China’s aggressive and 
egoistic stance focused on promoting its trade interests without taking into 
consideration the interests of its other partners puts obstacles to economic 
cooperation within the framework of SCO.118  
In conclusion, as Troitskiy rightly observes “as the leading power 
in the CSTO and EURASEC and as member of the SCO, Russia faces 
a dilemma”.119  Should it focus on the military-strategic component of 
cooperation or rather on “soft” security and economics? In the former 
case, the SCO might overshadow the CSTO or at least create confusing 
choices (with unpredictable outcomes) for Central Asian states.120  In the 
latter case, China may gain additional leverage within the SCO – given 
China’s increasing economic clout and its ability to make a way into 
Central Asia through both small-scale trade and large state-supported 
investment programs which might lead to declining of the importance of 
EURASEC.121   
3.3 Central Asian member states
In terms of geography, Central Asian states are located between Russia 
and China. Sandwiched between these two powers, the Central Asian 
member-states of SCO are compelled to maintain balance of power in 
the region through conduct of multi-vector strategy of balancing. Hence, 
for Central Asian states the SCO serves mainly as a structure that allows 
balancing first, between the old hegemon Russia and the expanding power 
of China, and second, between these powers and the states and institutions 
of the West. 122  In this context, the principal value of the SCO for the Central 
Asian states lies in the fact that it enables them, at least formally, “to take 
part in generating regional approaches to cooperation and security on an 
117 Ibid. 
118 Lukin, “Rossiya i ShOS”, p.7
119 Troitskiy, “A Russian Perspective on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, p.35
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Bayles and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional security 
institution”, p.14
86
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs 
Number 15-16, 2008- 2009 Number 15-16, 2008- 2009 87
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs 
equal basis with the larger regional powers”123.  Ruslan Maksutov contends that 
“it is an opportunity that Central Asia has not had before in modern times”.124 
As noted above, the SCO has provided the Central Asian states with 
ample opportunities to balance the influence of Russia and China in the region. 
In particular, Bayles and Dunay note that by being able to take their distinctive 
positions on security issues “in a forum with China present, not to mention the 
far-flung observer states, helps to offset the subordinate role that these countries 
have been obliged to accept in practice in the post-Soviet CSTO, where military 
cooperation is inexorably dominated by Russia”.125  In this connection, Olcott 
recalls that one Central Asian foreign minister confided at an off-record meeting 
at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace that the biggest advantage his country 
gained from membership in the SCO was that it could use China to bolster its 
position vis-à-vis Russia, when those in his national capital disagreed with those 
in Moscow. 126    
Moreover, the creation of the SCO has not strained the Central Asian 
countries’ relationships with the U.S., other Western countries and multilateral 
organizations such as EU and OSCE. In fact, it was after the founding of the SCO 
in June 2001 that Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan agreed to provide military facilities 
to the U.S.-led anti-terrorist coalition’s operations in Afghanistan; and Kyrgyzstan 
still hosts the U.S. air base notwithstanding the SCO’s 2005 Astana Declaration.127 
123 Ruslan Maksutov,  The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Central Asian 
Perspective, SIPRI Project Paper, (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, August 2006), p.4,  <http://www.sipri.org/contents.worldsec/eurosec.html> 
(accessed on May 07, 2007)  
124 Ibid. 
125 Bayles and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional security 
institution”, p.14
126 Olcott, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Changing the “Playing Field” in 
Central Asia, p.11 
127 Following the US strong criticism of the Uzbek Government’s heavy-handed 
crackdown on popular protests at Andijan in May 2005 relations between US and Uzbekistan, 
which until then had been considered as the US “strategic partner”, severely deteriorated. This 
in turn led the SCO member states at Astana Summit held in July 2005 to issue a declaration 
calling for members of the US-led international anti-terrorism coalition to set a timeframe for 
withdrawal of their forces from the territory of the SCO member countries, a move apparently 
initiated by Uzbekistan and enthusiastically supported primarily by Russia. Not long after 
the said summit, the US base at Karshi-Khanabad in Uzbekistan was closed down.
Under the auspices of OSCE and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) 
programs, the Central Asian states have been receiving substantial Western 
aid and advice for military reform and technical interoperability as well as 
for the development of defensive, intelligence-gathering and enforcement 
capabilities against various “new threats”. 128 
In addition, the Central Asian states, most notably Kazakhstan, have 
put forward and started to realize independent security initiatives such as 
the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-building measures in Asia 
(CICA) and the establishment of stronger ties with other outside actors 
not previously involved in the Central Asian region.129  Bayles and Dunay 
consider CICA as another “effort to dilute Russian dominance”.130  In 
this regard, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy can be considered as the most 
vivid example of Central Asian “balancing”. In a July 2006 speech made 
at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, then-Kazakh Foreign Minister 
and the current President of the Senate of the republic, Kassymzhomart 
Tokaev, stated that his country would “work to keep the SCO universal 
and well-balanced”.131  In January 2006 an Individual Partnership Action 
Plan between Kazakhstan and NATO was signed, making Kazakhstan 
the first Central Asian state to conclude such an accord with the above 
organization.132  And in September of the same year, Kazakhstan’s President 
Nursultan Nazarbaev visited the US, seeking a wide-ranging “strategic 
partnership” with Washington.133  Kazakhstan has also contributed 27 
128 Olga Oliker, and David A. Shlapak, U.S. Interests in Central Asia: Policy Priorities and 
Military Roles (RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, Calif., 2005), p.48
129 CICA currently consists of 17 members (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, 
Israel, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Palestine, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan) and 9 observers (Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, 
Ukraine, the USA and Vietnam).    
130 Bayles and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional security 
institution”, p.14 
131 Kassymzhomart Tokaev, “Kazakhstan: strengthening security in Central Asia through 
democratic reforms and economic development”, Address to the W.P. Carey Forum, Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute, Washington D.C., July 5, 2006, <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/
inside/forum/> (accessed on May 09, 2007) 
132 Maksutov,  The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Central Asian Perspective, p.7
133 D.R. Sands, “’Strategic’ accord planned for Nazarbayev’s  U.S. visit”, Washington Times, 
8 July 2006
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personnel from its peacekeeping battalion (KAZBAT) as part of the 
international peacekeeping operation in Iraq with a mandate to carry out 
humanitarian activities. Given that Kazakhstan is the third largest member 
of the SCO and a country widely-respected for its stable policies, attempts 
to depict the SCO as an anti-Western-bloc are becoming frail.
Lastly, as Maksutov emphasizes, “the barely concealed internal 
contradictions within the SCO leave little room for the organization to 
evolve into a strong institutionalized alliance like NATO”.134  Besides 
the earlier-discussed divergence of interests between Russia and China, 
the Central Asian states are also beset by lack of natural empathy among 
each other as well as mutually-shared distrust towards larger powers in 
the region.135 Contradictions among Central Asian states reflect not only 
inter-state problems in the region  but also disagreements among ruling 
elites on perspectives and issues facing the SCO. There are increasing signs 
of a certain sort of competition between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. One 
cannot totally discount the fact that Uzbekistan’s relatively late joining of 
the SCO was conditioned by Tashkent’s aspiration to minimize the risk of 
the SCO promoting interests and succumbing to domination of Kazakhstan 
in the region. In other words, by joining the SCO, Uzbekistan has had 
more opportunities to influence the shaping of events taking place within 
the SCO. On the other hand, since Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s respective 
relationships with Uzbekistan are not characterized by particular closeness, 
it could be assumed that through the SCO the latter two countries would 
strive to weaken Uzbekistan’s leverage over them.
3.4 The observer states
As of today, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan have been granted the 
status of observer states in the SCO. Mongolia became the first country 
to become an observer in 2004, while the other three states acquired the 
same status in 2005. 136 
134 Maksutov,  The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Central Asian Perspective, p.6
 135 More on factors leading to inter-state tensions in the Central Asian region see International 
Crisis Group (ICG), Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, ICG Asia Report 
No.33, (4 April 2002)  
136 Bayles and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional security 
institution”, p.18
The status of observer was not foreseen in the SCO’s original statutes 
and only following the 2004 summit was the regulation of observer status 
at the SCO adopted. The following rights are provided to observer states: 
a) to attend the open meetings of Council of Heads and/or the Council 
of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of SCO member states; b) to 
attend open meetings of the MFA Council and  Conferences of Heads of 
Ministries and/or Departments of SCO member states; c) to participate in 
discussions over issues lying within the competence of the SCO institutions 
without the right to vote and with advance consent of the chairperson, to 
circulate through the SCO Secretary-General’s statements, written in the 
working languages of the SCO, on issues of their concern lying within the 
competence of the SCO; d) to gain access to documents and decisions of 
the SCO institutions, if the relevant institutions of the SCO do not impose 
restrictions on their dissemination.137          
As seen from the above regulation, whereas the heads of states and 
other high-ranking officials of observer states regularly participate in all 
higher-level meetings of the SCO such as summits of heads of state and 
meetings of heads of governments, representatives of observer states have 
no right to take part in lower-level meetings (expert and other levels) where 
the issues pertaining to security and economic cooperation are discussed 
in a greater detail. 
As regards the observer states in the SCO as a group, Bayles and Dunay 
rightly note that “they form a disparate group, especially in terms of their 
degrees of democracy and of international acceptance and the nature of 
their group affiliations”.138  The one motive for their association with the 
SCO, as Bayles and Dunay further elaborate, “may reliably be attributed 
to all of them is an interest in the opening up of trade across Central Asia 
in general and joint approaches to (and possible Chinese investments in) 
trans-Asian energy deliveries and infrastructure links in particular.”139 
Since observer states, as mentioned above, have different motivations 
in participating in the SCO, they have less at stake with regard to this 
137 See Regulations on Observer Status at Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Secsto.
org, <http://www.sectsco.org/news_detail.asp?id=1485&LanguageID=2> (accessed on 
October 10, 2008)
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organization and use it differently than the original members. India, 
which has been developing close relations with the US since recent times, 
places relatively low priority to the SCO constantly sending only low-key 
ministers to the SCO annual summits. Its main interest in the SCO is to 
use the organization as a means of balancing Pakistan. On the contrary, 
Pakistan has expressed its desire to join the SCO becoming the first country 
to apply for full membership. However, it would not be in the best interests 
of the SCO members to “import the India-Pakistan confrontation into 
the grouping as it has enough security problems and potential divisions 
already”.140    
Furthermore, Iran has certain reasons to fully join the SCO and is 
more aggressive than India. Iran is isolated even in the Persian Gulf and 
faces pressure from the US, particularly on the issue of its nuclear program. 
For Iran, the SCO would provide a good avenue for maneuvering and 
balancing against the U.S. and Tehran is eager to join the SCO as a full-
fledged member. Since Iran’s joining the SCO as a member would make 
the organization look like an anti-US alliance or the very least, as a “rogue 
states’ union”, SCO member states would not be willing to offend the US 
by granting this status to Iran. 
As far as Mongolia is concerned, it is the only country which faces no 
opposition from all SCO member states, if it expresses the interest in a full-fledged 
membership in the SCO. In particular, one of the leading Russian authorities on 
the SCO, Director of the Center of East Asia and SCO Studies at the Moscow 
State Institute of International Relations, Alexander Lukin argues that: 
Admission of Mongolia into the SCO would have a great demonstration 
effect in terms of filling territorial “gap” in the SCO and stimulation 
of economic cooperation taking into consideration the high natural 
resource potentials of this country. A certain period has elapsed since 
this country has preferred economic orientation at the West. Moreover, 
in the eyes of Washington, Mongolia serves as an example of a post-
communist democracy in Asia, for which it is natural to rely in its 
foreign policy exclusively on the US. Therefore, at least a partial re-
orientation of Ulan Bator towards SCO participant-states would be 
beneficial not only for Russia and China but for all participants.141 
140 Ibid., p.20
141 Lukin, “Rossiya i ShOS”, pp.14-15
Moreover, even the SCO Secretary-General Bolat Nurgaliev has stated 
in his interview to a Mongolian newspaper Udriin Sonin that “if Mongolia 
joins the SCO as a member, this would not imply that it would restrict its 
partnership with America”.142 
However, at the moment Mongolia has no desire to become a member 
of the SCO preferring to keep its present observer status. Within the 
SCO, Mongolia is primarily interested in the matters related to economic 
cooperation, particularly energy, infrastructure and transit traffic. As 
Japanese scholar Akihiro Iwashita concludes, Mongolia “hopes to develop 
its relations with the US and Japan as “third neighbour countries” beyond 
the border and it is not heavily invested in the “Shanghai spirit”.143 
To sum up, the specified interests of the SCO participants discussed 
here are in no way reminiscent to those of the Cold W ar era which makes 
it in turn impossible to turn this organization into a closed military bloc.
IV. Is the SCO a military alliance or not?
As demonstrated in the first part of this article, the majority of alliance 
theorists including Glenn Snyder, Roger Dingman, George Modelski, 
George Liska, Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham hold that “alliances” 
are primarily formal associations of states established against a third party. 
In particular, while noting that alliances are cooperative endeavors, Snyder 
asserts that the primary goal of alliances “is the prosecution of conflict 
with an outside party”. 144 
If considered from this perspective, the SCO defies the conventional 
alliance theory. The SCO Charter, as well as the organization’s other 
documents which define the aims and scope of activities of the SCO, 
explicitly emphasize that this organization is not directed against any states 
142 Yu. Delgermaa, “Bolat Nurgaliev: Mongol ShHAB-yn gishuuneer elsvel Ameriktai 
tunshilj bolohgui gesen yum baihgui” [Bolat Nurgaliev: If Mongolia joins the SCO as a 
member, this would not imply that it would restrict its partnership with America], Udriin 
Sonin, No.075 (2527), (April 30, 2007)
143 Akihiro Iwashita, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Japan: Moving 
Together to Reshape the Eurasian Community”, Brookings.edu,  <http://www.brookings.
edu/articles/2008/0128_asia_iwashita.aspx?=1> (accessed on August 05, 2008)  
144 Snyder, Alliance Politics, p.1
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or international organizations.145  Moreover, formation of a military alliance, 
which in the SCO’c case, is often claimed to be directed against the West or the 
US in particular, would undeniably contradict not only all official documents 
of the SCO but most importantly – the interests of its members, each of whom 
are interested in cooperation with the US and West in many areas, particularly in 
realization of their economic development tasks.  In this connection, it would be 
perhaps useful to note that despite Russia’s recent deterioration of relations with 
the West, China and other Central Asian members of the SCO, most notably 
Kazakhstan who maintain strong economic cooperation with the West, would 
not allow the SCO to turn into an anti-Western alliance.    
As for other characteristics of an “alliance” including the conclusion of a 
defense pact that would operate in the event of war or preclusion for some or 
all members from joining other alliances,147  they do not fit in the case of the 
SCO. The SCO has no formal defense treaty that obliges its members to enter 
a war if any of its members is attacked. Instead, the Treaty on Long-term Good 
Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation signed by the SCO member-states 
on August 16, 2007 in Bishkek stipulates in its article 6 that in case of emergence 
of a threat to security of any party to the treaty, it may hold consultations with 
other parties within the framework of the organization for an adequate reaction 
to such situation.148 Apart from this multilateral treaty, the Russian-Chinese 
Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation also contains an 
article on contacts and consultations in a similar situation. 149  
145 See for example The Charter of Shanghai Cooperation Organization, June 07, 
2002, Saint-Petersburg, and the Declaration on the Establishment of Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, June 15, 2001, Shanghai   
146 Lukin and Mochulsky , “Shankhaiskaya organizatsiya sotrudnichestva: strukturnoye 
oformleniye i perspektivy razvitiya”, p.16
147 See Evans and Newnham, The Dictionary of International Relations, p.15
148 Dogovor o dolgosrochnom dobrososedstve, druzhbe i sotrudnichestve 
gosudarstv-chlenov Shankhaiskoi organizatsii sotrudnichestva [The Treaty on Long-term 
Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation of States-Members of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization], Bishkek, 16 August 2007 [a Russian-language hardcopy of this 
document was obtained by author from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia]
149 Stat’ya 9, Dogovor o dobrososedstve, druzhbe i sotrudnichestve mezhdu RF i 
KNR, Moskva, 16 iyulya 2001 g. [Article 9, The Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship 
and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, 
Moscow, July 16, 2001], Asiapacific.narod.ru, <http://asiapacific.narod.ru/countries/china/
treaty_about_peace.htm> (accessed on October 07, 2008)
However, it would be wrong to interpret the above clauses as a possibility 
for formation of an alliance. For instance, a similar clause can be found in the 
treaty between Russia and the DPRK, but no one would assert that Russia and 
North Korea had formed an alliance. In the case of outbreak of a conflict between 
China and US over Taiwan, would Russia provide military support to China? Or 
if the US makes the Chinese strategic armaments irrelevant through introduction 
of TMD, would Russia be willing to take a risk of offering its nuclear “umbrella” 
to China? The answer to both questions is negative.150  China would prefer to 
maintain cordial relations with the US rather than to find itself under a Russian 
nuclear “umbrella”, thereby allowing Russians to take the role of “big brother”, 
which was the case in the beginning of the Cold War.151   Therefore, what is clear 
is the fact that no legal basis exists for turning the SCO into a military alliance.    
Furthermore, if the SCO was a military alliance, the CSTO would not 
have approved the membership in the SCO of five of its seven members. On 
this point, one could argue that the US holds simultaneous memberships in a 
number of alliances such as NATO, ANZUS or bilateral alliance with Japan. 
However, all of the aforementioned US alliances have different geographical 
scopes. It could be observed that the geographical scope of both SCO and CSTO 
is the same post-Soviet space. If the SCO was a military alliance, there can be no 
doubt that its functions and activities would come into direct conflict with the 
Russian-dominated CSTO. And most importantly, Article 1 of the Collective 
Security Treaty (1992) which preceded the formation of CSTO in 2002 explicitly 
forbids the parties to join other military alliances.152        
While comparing the SCO with contemporary military blocs such as 
NATO and CSTO, it is important to emphasize that the SCO lacks essential 
elements of a typical modern military alliance such as an integrated military-
political structure with permanent operational headquarters, a rapid reaction 
force, and continuous political deliberations which both NATO and CSTO 
have.153  Moreover, as Marcel de Haas convincingly argues: 
150 Akihiro Iwashita, “ShOS mozhet prevratit’sya vo vtoroye SNG” [SCO could turn 
into another CIS], October 10, 2007, Tazar.kg, <http://www.tazar.kg/news.php?i=513>1> 
(accessed on October 11, 2008)  
151 Ibid.
152 Dogovor o kollektivnoy bezopasnosti [Treaty on Collective Security], Tashkent, 
15 May 1992, Dkb.gov.ru, <http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm> (accessed on October 
17, 2008)  
153 See de Haas, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Momentum towards a 
Mature Security Alliance, pp.19-20 and p.30 
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An essential difference between the organizational development of 
the SCO and NATO is the fact that NATO is aimed primarily at external 
security risks whereas the SCO concentrates strongly on security within 
the territory covered by its member states.154  
This lies in stark contrast to conventional alliance theory, which 
argues that alliances are first and foremost designed against external 
attacks. Although writers such as Richard Weitz have portrayed the above-
mentioned difference of the SCO from traditional military alliances as an 
inherent failure or weakness of the Shanghai process155 , Bayles and Dunay 
underline that: 
It would be impossible to imagine Russia guaranteeing China’s entire 
territory against attack and vice versa, let alone Chinese and Russian forces 
– and potentially their nuclear weapons – being brought under a single 
command with joint forces.156 
Having considered the differences of the SCO from traditional military 
alliances, it is equally important to mention their similarities. In particular, 
what makes the SCO similar to alliances is the fact that all members of the 
grouping have used such activities as joint military exercises, staff training 
and weapons procurements which normally take place under the rubric 
of alliance relationship. For instance, besides Russian sophisticated arms 
and military technology sales to China, more than 500 Chinese students 
study in Russian military academies.157  Likewise, as Wilkins observes, 
Russian military advisers and scientists have flocked into China, recalling 
the heyday of the 1950’s Sino-Soviet alliance.158  However, it should also 
be pointed out that SCO members’ exchanges of defense equipment and 
technology are overwhelmingly bilateral, although there are some related 
joint capacity-building programs in the CIS and CSTO. 159 
154 Ibid., p.30
155 Richard Weitz, “Shanghai summit fails to yield NATO-style defence agreement”, 
Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol.18, no.8 (Aug.2006), p.42  
156 Bayles and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional security 
institution”, p.22
157 Stakelbeck, Jr. ,  “Is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization a Military 
Confederacy?”
158 Wilkins, Russia’s ‘Strategic Partnerships:’ Building A Framework For Analysis, p.22
159 Bayles and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional security 
institution”, p.21
As regards joint military exercises, these have included a Sino-Kyrgyz 
joint border security exercise in 2002; a multilateral exercise in eastern 
Kazakhstan and Chinese Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region in 2003; 
a large Sino-Russian “Peace Mission 2005” exercise that was observed 
by other SCO member states; a multilateral “East Anti-Terror 2006” 
exercise hosted by Uzbekistan in 2006; and finally, “Peace Mission 2007” 
which was held from August 9-17, 2007 in Xinjiang, PRC as well as in 
Russia’s Chelyabinsk oblast’ (province) with participation of all SCO 
members.160  
Since the key security objective of the SCO lies in combating threats 
posed by “terrorism, separatism and extremism”, the scenarios of the 
exercises were related to the above themes. However, these exercises, 
especially, Peace Mission 2005 and Peace Mission 2007 were seen by some 
Western analysts161  as clear proof that Russia and China aim to create a 
military bloc to counterbalance NATO and diminish the US presence in 
Central Asia. Indeed, deployment of Tu-22 and Tu-95 strategic bombers, 
missile destroyers, submarines and AWACS during the Peace Mission 2005 
exercise led many observers to question the alleged “antiterrorist” or “peace 
support mission element”.162  What is more, the fact that the exercise was 
held almost immediately after the SCO’s Astana Summit which demanded 
the US set a timeline for withdrawal of its military bases from the Central 
Asian region indicates that “the signals it conveyed about Chinese-Russian 
capacity and resolve were not aimed exclusively at potential non-state 
adversaries”. 163 
As for the Peace Mission 2007, unlike Peace Mission 2005 it did not 
involve the use of heavy military equipment.164 Roger McDermott considers 
that this exercise was unique since it included all of the SCO member 
160For more detailed analysis of these exercises see Roger N. McDermott, The Rising 
Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007, The Jamestown Foundation, (October 2007)
161See for example Cohen and Tkacik, Jr., “Sino-Russian Military Maneuvers: A 
Threat to U.S. Interests in Eurasia”; and Stakelbeck, Jr., “Is the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization a Military Confederacy?”
162McDermott, The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007, p.6
163Bayles and Dunay, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a regional security 
institution”, p.23
164McDermott, The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 2007, p.11
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states.165  Moreover, the Peace Mission 2007 was significant in that “it was 
the first time that the PLA had ever sent complete organizational units 
to take part in a joint anti-terrorism military exercise outside China”.166 
As the Chinese conducted an intense media campaign to showcase to the 
world the “most open exercise ever”, this served Beijing’s goal to establish 
the positive international image of a modernized Chinese military.167  But 
the overwhelming significance of the SCO exercise for China remains in 
its concern with the problems of separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang, 
making it imperative to closely collaborate with its SCO counterparts in 
this respect.      
In Moscow’s case, as McDermott rightly observes, its agenda differs 
from Beijing in less than subtle ways.168  He further refers to Vitaliy 
Shlykov, a member of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council in Moscow, 
who indicated that Peace Mission 2007 should be understood in the wider 
strategic context of difficulties that emerged in Russia’s relationship 
with the West.169  In particular, the US unilateral plans to deploy BMD 
components in Poland and the Czech Republic are seen by Moscow as a 
direct challenge to its standing as a great power. As Eugene Rumer observes, 
the deployments represent a problem for Russian military planners largely 
due to a possibility of US interceptors interdicting Russian missiles during 
the early boost phase, and also because of the challenge it could present to 
Russia’s strategic parity with the US.170  In addition, given that the Baltic 
countries are already NATO members, while pro-Western governments in 
Georgia and Ukraine that came into power as a result of “color revolutions” 
in 2003 and 2004, make no secret of their plans to follow in footsteps of the 
former, Russia is increasingly seeing itself as being encircled. Therefore, 
Shlykov argues that:
The claims of the United States and NATO to primacy in the 
world should have some counterweights. There is no doubt that 






170 Eugene B. Rumer, “Russian Foreign Policy Beyond Putin”, Adelphi Papers, Vol.47, 
No. 390, (2007), p.26
Asia… Not a single state can get along today without allies. We 
are responding to America’s aspirations to world hegemony by 
various means, of which the infusion of the SCO military-political 
vector is just one.171 
In this sense, as mentioned earlier, Russia’s active involvement with 
China within the framework of the SCO can be regarded as an attempt 
to seek an alliance against a threat which is consistent with Stephen Walt’s 
“balance of threat theory”.172  As Walt suggests, “states ally to balance 
against threats rather against power alone”.173  Hence, taking into account 
that in the longer term, both Russia and China are interested in maintaining 
positive relations with the US, balancing against threats posed by US 
unilateral actions sounds more plausible than the Cold War-style “balance 
of power” based on a zero-sum game. Russia values China’s cooperation in 
voicing opposition to American hegemony, but it knows that this would 
not extend to endangering China’s economic ties with the US. 
In addition, the earlier-mentioned divergent political and economic 
interests as well as internal contradictions between SCO member states 
make it clear that at the moment it is premature to conclude that this 
organization is turning into a full-grown security organization, let alone a 
military alliance. In this context, the avoidance of explicit support of SCO 
members at the grouping’s latest summit held at Dushanbe in August 2008, 
from providing unequivocal support to Russia’s recent recognition of the 
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, is an important 
reminder for the fact that it is still too early to consider this organization 
as a unified bloc.174  Given that the principle of territorial integrity is a 
171 Vitaliy Shlykov quoted in McDermott, The Rising Dragon: SCO Peace Mission 
2007, p.22
172 See Walt, Origins of Alliances, pp.21-26
173 Ibid., p.5
174 See for example “Russia: The Kremlin Tries to put on brave face following 
diplomatic slap over Georgia”, Eurasianet.org, August 29, 2008, <http://www.eurasianet.
org/departments/insight/articles/eav082808b_pr.shtml> (accessed on August 30, 2008); 
Dilip Niro, “Russia’s one step too far”, guardian.co.uk,<http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/2008/aug/29/russia.china>  (accessed on August 30, 2008); David L. Stern, 
“Security Group Refuses to Back Russia’s Actions”, The New York Times, August 29, 
2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/world/europe/29russia.html> (accessed on 
August 29, 2008)
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“sacred cow” for China as well as for Central Asian states which have their 
own ethnic minorities with the potential for conflict, such stance of SCO 
member states should serve as no surprise.     
In light of all the above-mentioned conceptual and empirical factors, it 
could be observed that the cooperation among SCO members including its 
military-political component does not imply that its members had formed 
an “alliance” but at best can be described as one form of an “alignment”. 
As Snyder demonstrates, it is useful to stipulate somewhat different 
meanings between the two terms.175  Thus, as discussed earlier, whereas 
alliance is defined by Snyder “as a formal association of states for use or 
non-use of military force against states outside their own membership”, 
“alignment” refers to “expectations of states about whether they will be 
supported or opposed by other states in future interactions”.176  According 
to Snyder “formal alliances are simply one of the behavioral means to create 
or strengthen alignments”.177  Moreover, he provides several reasons for 
possible emergence of “alignment”, from which the following one may be 
more or less relevant to the SCO - “expectations of support may be created 
by various behavioral means, such as joint military planning or diplomatic 
statements and agreements of various kinds, up to and including formal 
alliances”.178  
  Since the “pattern of alignment” throughout the international system 
is always vague and constantly changes with changing patterns of power, 
interests and issue priorities,179  it seems that no definitive answer can be 
given to the question of whether cooperation among the SCO states can 
be regarded as a typical form of “alignment” in accordance with alliance 
theory. As mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis, according to the 
Chinese and Russians, the SCO represents a completely new model of 
state-to state relations which transcends the Cold War mentality and 
therefore, it is characterized by partnership but not alliance. Hence, the 
cooperation among SCO participants might be considered as an alternative 
alignment system which cannot be fully explained by traditional realist 
alliance theory.






Covering one of the largest geographical areas of any regional 
organization and encompassing a population of 1.5 billion people, which 
is around a quarter of the world’s population, there is no doubt that the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization is becoming an influential force 
in international arena. As this organization has been labeled by some 
commentators in the West as the “NATO of the East” or a new Warsaw 
Pact180 , this article has attempted to determine whether this organization 
indeed represents an example of a military alliance.
In order to find an answer to this question, it has examined at first 
the history of the SCO starting from birth of the Shanghai Five in 1996 
and its subsequent evolution, and second, it discussed the specific interests 
of participants in the SCO. With this history in mind, the article then 
applied alliance theory to help answer this question, which might be 
considered as a modest contribution to a more objective analysis of the 
SCO. The findings of the research are as follows:
First, despite the SCO’s rhetoric, some of its actions contain elements 
of counterbalancing against the West, particularly the US, witnessed 
in its strongly-stated stance demanding the US to withdraw from the 
SCO sphere. Moreover, the fact that its supposedly “counter-terrorist” 
exercises, most notably Peace Mission 2005 involved forces and activities 
more relevant to a high-intensity warfare against another alliance, 
substantiates the above claim. 
Nevertheless, this organization is not and never could be a 
fully-fledged military alliance. The divergent strategic priorities of 
its two predominant members – China and Russia, as well as internal 
contradictions among its Central Asian members indicate that it is 
unlikely for the SCO to develop into a powerful united bloc that could 
present a challenge, let alone a threat to Western interests. Moreover, as 
emphasized in fourth part, not only will it contradict the principles of 
this organization, stated in all its official documents, but it will also run 
against long-term strategic interests of its members. As the Chinese scholar 
180 Fred Weier, “Russia, China looking to form ‘NATO of the East?”, The Christian 
Science Monitor, October 26, 2005; Frederick W. Stakelbeck Jr., “A New Bloc Emerges?”, 
Americanthinker.com, August 5, 2005, <http://www.americanthinker.com/articles.
php?article_id=4703>  (accessed on July 30, 2007)  
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Yu Bin notes “this is not a mere rhetoric to calm down Washington, but 
reflects a strategic fact of life”.181 
Second, from a conceptual perspective, the application of alliance 
theory has demonstrated that the SCO falls short of a typical military 
alliance. Moreover, I argue that traditional alliance theory has a limited 
application to explaining the phenomenon of SCO. The closest resemblance 
it has with what is discussed in conventional theory is with the “pattern of 
alignment”. Therefore, in words of Wilkins, “those who talk of “NATO 
of the East” or new Eastern bloc miss the point.”182  In case of the SCO, 
a formal alliance along the lines of Cold War period is neither intended 
nor required. The SCO is a less strict instrument. As it is primarily based 
on Russo-Chinese strategic partnership, the point which was emphasized 
above, it represents a new type of looser, more informal, and flexible 
alignment systems that are emerging in the 21st century. As Lo asserts 
“the strategic partnership is a dynamic rather than a static phenomenon, 
not founded in eternal “truths” and principles, but flexible in its response 
to events and emerging international trends”.183  
This, in my view, most eloquently captures the debate on whether the 
SCO can be considered as a military alliance or not. Therefore, despite the 
fact that the SCO is not a military alliance from theoretical and empirical 
perspectives, it nevertheless contains potential of evolving into a more 
mature security organization which does not necessarily have to conform 
to traditional alliance theories.     
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